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Abstract 
 The purpose of the study was to establish the effect of corporate 
governance and capital structure on performance of firms listed at the East 
African community securities exchange. Specifically the study sought to 
establish the effect of capital structure on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance of listed companies in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Based on the agency theory this study builds a 
comprehensive framework to answer the research question on whether good 
corporate governance affects firms performance by integrating capital 
structure into the governance model.  A census survey was carried out on all 
the 98 listed companies between 2009 and 2013 in Nairobi Securities 
Exchange, Uganda Securities Exchange, Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange and 
Rwanda Stock Exchange. Out of the 98 firms that were targeted, 56 were 
analyzed constituting 57%. The findings revealed that the there was a 
significant positive relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. The study also confirmed that there is a positive significant 
intervening effect of capital structure (leverage) on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. From a theoretical perspective, 
this study not only explains how corporate governance affects firm 
performance, but also uncovers the importance of capital structure in a 
corporate governance system.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, capital structure and firm performance  
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Introduction 
 Corporate Governance (CG) and Capital Structure (CS) plays a big 
role in the maximization of shareholders’ wealth and good CG is important in 
increasing the market value of a firm while higher financial leverage 
decreases a firm value by increasing bankruptcy risk (Sheifer and Vishny, 
1997). Sound CG governance mechanisms help assure investors that they will 
get their capital back and receive an adequate return on their investment. 
Firms with good CG provide transparent disclosures and are investor friendly 
therefore are able to access capital markets on better terms. A well-developed 
financial system provides a market for corporate control while a strong legal 
system protects investors’ contractual rights by minimizing the risk of loss 
from managerial opportunism. CG is defined as the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992), and it encompasses 
rules as well as the framework of relationships and processes designed to 
ensure that directors act in the interest of the company. An optimal capital 
structure is the debt/equity ratio for the firm that minimizes the cost of 
financing and reduces the chances of bankruptcy.  
 There has been a great deal of empirical work providing evidence that 
CG, corporate financial decisions and firm performance are affected by the 
presence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. CG 
activities enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations with the 
help of proper supervision and control; thereby playing a very important role 
in aligning the interest of shareholders and management to reduce agency 
conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). With sound governance structure, it is 
much easier for organizations to obtain loans from investors as a functional 
corporate structure protects the interest of shareholders, increases 
transparency and reduces the agency conflicts. Firms with poor governance 
practices face more agency problems as managers of those firm’s can easily 
obtain private benefits due to poor CG structure.  
 
Corporate Governance 
 CG is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. It 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. It also provides the structure through which 
company objectives are set and monitoring performance attained (OECD, 
1999).  
 Craig (2005) stated that CG is defined and practiced in different ways 
globally depending upon the relative power of owners, managers and 
provider of capital. It entails the procedures, customs, laws and policies that 
affect the way corporations are directed, administered or controlled.  An 
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important objective of CG is to ensure accountability and transparency for 
those who are involved in the policy implementation of organizations through 
mechanisms that will reduce principal agent conflict.  Keasey and Wright 
(1993) define CG as a framework for effective monitoring, regulation and 
control of companies which allows alternative internal and external 
mechanisms for achieving the laid down objectives. The internal mechanisms 
include the board composition, managerial ownership, and non-managerial 
shareholding including the institutional shareholding while external 
mechanisms includes;  the statutory audit, the market for corporate control 
and stock market evaluation of corporate performance.  
 
Capital Structure 
 CS refers to the way a corporation finances its assets through a 
combination of equity and debt. The landmark studies of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958; 1963) about CS irrelevance and tax shield advantage paved 
way for the development of other theories. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) a firm's optimal CS will involve the trade-off among the 
effects of corporate and personal taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs.  
 The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed 
firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in 
perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or 
otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of 
outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers 
maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory 
suggests that the choice of CS may help mitigate these agency costs. Under 
the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces 
the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or 
encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991 and Myers, 2001).  
 
Firm Performance 
 Firm performance in the literature is based on the value of the firm. 
CG affects value as a result of reduced expropriation by insiders and 
improvement in the expected cash flow that can be distributed to investors 
(Black et al., 2006). To evaluate performance, it is necessary to determine the 
constituents of good performance using performance indicators. To be useful, 
a performance indicator must be measureable, relevant and important to the 
organization. Financial performance used in empirical research on CG fit into 
both accounting-based measures and market-based measures. The most 
commonly used accounting-based measures include the return on assets 
(ROA) while the most commonly used market-based measure includes the 
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Tobin Q (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). In order to analyze the relationship 
between the variables, firm performance was measured by ROA. 
 ROA is used to measure operating performance based on the 
shareholders equity and it explains the efficiency of the management. ROA 
shows how profitable company’s assets are in generating revenue. It is given 
by the ratio between net income and total assets. It indicates the unit amount 
of earning derived from each unit of assets used. It is a useful in comparing 
competing companies in the same industry (Black et al., 2006). 
  
East African Community Securities Exchange 
 There are currently four securities exchanges forming the East African 
Community Securities Exchange (EACSE) market namely the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE), Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), Uganda 
Securities Exchange (USE) and Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE). NSE was 
formed in 1954 and it is one of the active capital markets in Africa and the 
largest in East Africa and there are 61 companies listed at this exchange. The 
DSE was incorporated in September 1996 as a private limited company and it 
has 16 listed companies. The USE was launched in June 1997, is run under 
the jurisdiction of the Capital Markets Authority, which reports to the Central 
Bank of Uganda and it has 16 listed companies.  The Rwanda Stock 
Exchange (RSE) is the youngest exchange in EAC, having opened for 
business on 31st January 2011. The RSE took over from the operations of the 
Rwanda over the Counter Exchange (ROTCE), which began business in bond 
trading in January 2008. There are 5 companies listed at RSE. Burundi does 
not have a security exchange and firms finance their financial needs through 
commercial banks (CMA 2012).  
 The EAC countries have developed and gazetted the guidelines for 
good CG practices for listed companies and this was in response to the 
growing importance of governance issues both in emerging and developing 
economies and for promoting growth in domestic and regional capital 
markets. It is also in recognition of the role of good governance in corporate 
performance, capital formation and maximization of shareholders value as 
well as protection of investor’s rights. The development of the guidelines 
took into account work that had been undertaken extensively by several 
jurisdictions through many task forces and committees including OECD and 
the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG).  
 
Research Problem 
 The impact of CG on firm performance has been a subject of great 
empirical investigations in finance. CG has been part of research in business 
economics since Adam Smith’s 1776 seminal publication of an inquiry into 
the nature and causes of the wealth of nations and undoubtedly given impetus 
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through classic publication of the separation of corporate ownership from 
control (Berle and Means, 1932). The separation of ownership and control in 
a firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in 
perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or 
otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of 
outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers 
maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. CG and the 
choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. CG is an 
important factor in improving the value and performance of the firm and the 
impact differs country to country because of different structures resulting 
from dissimilar social, economic, and regulatory conditions. CS also has 
different impacts on the value of the firm country to country because of the 
different regulations.  
 The collapse of major corporations such as Enron, WorldCom and the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in the UK and US has 
stimulated the recent interest in CG. The Asian economic crisis also has 
contributed to the raising profile of CG. In the EAC, governance has been 
debated in the context of state ownership of corporations where corruption, 
mismanagement and government subsidization of failing enterprises have 
been the defining features. There has been an attempt to address CG 
challenges in EAC by the privatization policy and the capital markets 
authorities. There has also been a worldwide effort to improve the effectives 
of CG. These include the OECD and CACG which have led to the 
development of principles for effective CG. The issues that have stimulated 
interests in the phenomenon of CG, point to particular causes of governance 
crises. These include weak legal and regulatory systems, inconsistent 
accounting and auditing standards, and poor banking practices. Thin and 
poorly regulated capital markets, ineffective oversight by corporate boards of 
directors, and little regard for the rights of minority shareholders are also 
problems with respect to CG (World Bank, 2000).  
 Aduda and Musyoka (2011) evaluated the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm performance in the Kenyan banking 
industry between 2004 and 2008. The study found a negative relationship 
between executive compensation and the bank size and this was attributed to 
the diminishing influence of key owners as the bank grows in size. The study 
did not consider the intervening effects of other variables on the relationship 
between CG and firm performance. Lishenga (2012) also evaluated the effect 
of board meetings as proxy for CG on firm performance. The study found 
that the frequency of board meetings increases following poor performance 
and as a consequence of such meetings performance of firms improved 
because frequency of board meetings allows for better communication 
between management and directors. The study only considered one CG 
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governance mechanism and did not consider the effects of CG when 
measured as an index incorporating all the variables.   
 The above studies yielded mixed results and also did not consider the 
combinative effect of CS on the relationship between CG and firm 
performance. Most of the studies were done in developed economies 
therefore contextual differences may yield different results thus findings and 
conclusions of these studies may not apply to firms operating in the East 
African community context. Some of the studies also utilized small samples, 
while the current study used a large sample which comprised all the firms 
listed at the East African community exchanges. Specifically, the study 
investigated the influence of CS on the relationship between CG and firm 
performance. The study therefore attempted to answer the research question, 
what is the effect of capital structure on the relationship between CG and 
performance of firms in EACSE? 
 
Research Objectives 
 The broad objective of this study is to investigate how capital 
structure affect the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance: 
i. To examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance 
among the listed companies in East African Community Securities 
Exchange. 
ii. To evaluate the effect of corporate governance on capital structure among 
companies listed at the East African Community Securities Exchange. 
iii. To determine the effect of capital structure on firm performance among 
the listed companies in the East African Community Securities Exchange. 
iv. To determine the intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance among the 
companies listed at the East African Community Securities Exchange. 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
 The theoretical framework upon which CG and CS is based includes 
the agency theory free cash flow theory. Evidence from previous empirical 
studies has sought to confirm the effect of CG on firm performance and 
reviewed the theories. 
 
Agency Theory 
 CG has traditionally been associated with the “principal-agent” or 
“agency” paradox. A “principal-agent” relationship arises when the person 
who owns a firm is not the same as the person who managers or controls it. 
Agency theory has its roots in economic theory and was developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and it states that shareholders who are the owners or 
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principals of the company delegate the running of business to the managers 
or agents. The shareholders expect the agents to act and make decisions in the 
principal’s interest but the agents may make contrary decisions. 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the separation of ownership 
and control has resulted in an agency problem as the managers who act as 
agents might not always act in the best interests of the shareholders or 
owners, who are the principals of the firm. This might be due to the interests 
of both parties which are not aligned. Agency problem results in agency 
costs, which are the costs of the separation of ownership and control. Agency 
costs have been defined as the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual costs.  
 
Free Cash Flow Theory  
 According to free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986), leverage itself can 
also act as a monitoring mechanism and thereby reduces the agency problem 
hence increasing firm value by reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. 
There are some consequences derived if a firm is employing higher leverage 
level in that managers of such firm will not be able to invest in non-profitable 
new projects, as doing so the new projects might not be able to generate cash 
flows to the firm, hence managers might fail in paying the fixed amount of 
interest on the debt or the principal when it’s due. It also might cause the 
inability to generate profit in a certain financial year that may result in failing 
to pay dividends to firm shareholders.  
 Leverage might not only be able to reduce the agency costs of free 
cash flow, but also can increase the efficiency of the managers. This is due to 
the debt market that might function as a more effective capital market 
monitoring. In addition, in order to obtain the debt financing, managers must 
show their abilities and efficiencies in managing the firm. Empirically, it has 
been proven that leverage proxied by bank lenders, can be substitute 
monitoring mechanism especially in weak CG firms, but not in the more 
active merger environments.   
 
Empirical Studies 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 The study builds on the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
who evaluated the relation between the principal and the agent. The 
principals who are the owners hire the agents to manage the firm and they 
may not necessary make decisions that are in the best interest of the owners. 
The value decreasing activities by the managers’ decreases profitability 
therefore CG plays an important role in enhancing firm value by reducing 
such activities. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also indicated that better-
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governed firms are more likely to invest in profitable projects, resulting in 
more efficient operations and higher expected future cash flows. 
 Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) conducted a study on the relationship 
between board composition and board size on firm performance. They 
focused on one of the board tasks of hiring and firing CEOs. Board 
independence depends on the bargain between the board and the CEO. The 
CEO prefers a less independent board while the board prefers to maintain its 
independence. Firms have been pressured by institutional investors and 
shareholder activists in the recent years to appoint directors with different 
backgrounds and expertise, under the assumption that greater diversity of the 
BODs should lead to less insular decision making processes and greater 
openness to change. A diverse workforce and leadership within the firm can 
increase its competitiveness as a great variety of ideas and viewpoints are 
available for decision- making, attract a large base of shareholders and 
employees, and help retain existing as well as potentially gain new 
consumers. They concluded that board composition is not related to firm 
performance, while board size has a negative relation to corporate 
performance. Both board composition and size do appear to be related to the 
quality of the board’s decisions regards CEO replacement and executive 
compensation.   
 Aduda and Musyoka (2011) while looking at CG mechanisms among 
commercial banks in Kenya found a negative  relationship between executive 
compensation and bank size and this has  been attributed to the diminishing 
influence of key owners as the bank grows in size. Performance ratios and 
opportunity only appear to be inversely related to big banks, as their 
executives appear to subordinate their immediate financial interests to that of 
the overall goal of the firm, which is to maximize profitability. The emphasis 
of the study was the banking sector in Kenya. 
 Himmelberg et al. (2002) further argued that CG and firm 
performance may be driven by common firm characteristics, some of which 
are neither clearly observable nor measurable.  Managers tend to hold large 
ownership stakes (which is commonly viewed in the literature as a 
mechanism to combat agency problems) in high-risk and high-growth firms 
to signify their commitment and with the use of equity-based remuneration; 
insider ownership may automatically increase after periods of strong 
performance. However, this spurious correlation does not offer any insight 
into the impact of insider ownership in reducing agency problems and 
improving firm performance. The results confirm the results of Cremers and 
Neir (2005) that both internal and external CG has a positive significant 
relationship with firm performance. Thus, the first hypothesis stated in the 
null form is:  
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 H1: There is no significant relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance  
 
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure 
 Empirical studies between CG and CS appear to be varied and 
inconclusive. According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), there is a significant 
relationship between capital structure and board size. Berger and Lubrano 
(2006) found that firms with larger board membership have low leverage or 
debt ratio. They assume that larger board size translates into strong pressure 
from the corporate board to make managers pursue lower leverage or debt 
ratio rather than have larger boards. Their findings suggest that large board 
size which are more entrenched due to superior monitoring by regulatory 
bodies, pursue higher leverage to raise company value. Berger et al (1997) 
argues that firms with higher leverage rather have relatively more outside 
directors, while firms with low percentage of outside directors experience 
lower leverage.  
 Capital structure of a company is based on the board of director’s 
decision and in compliance to CG code of best practices. According to Hart 
(1995) there exist a significant negative relationship between board size and 
capital structure and opposite finding on the association between CEO duality 
and leverage where it implies that larger boards adopt low debt policy and 
CEO as the board chairman tend to employ high proportion of debt. Jensen 
(1986) explains the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash 
flow, in situations where the firm generates substantial free cash flow making 
the conflict of interest among shareholders and managers especially severe.  
 Debt serves as a bonding or commitment device by reducing the free 
cash flow available to managers. In this respect, debt limits inefficiency of 
management, at least if managers want to repay the debt. Berger et al. (1997) 
find that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. When managers do not 
experience discipline from CG and control mechanisms, including 
monitoring by board, the threat of dismissal or takeover, and compensation-
based performance incentives, managers may prefer less leverage or adjusting 
it more slowly since they dislike performance pressures associated with 
commitment to repay the debt and interests on it in the future. 
 Berger (1997) finds that firms with larger board of directors generally 
have low debts equity levels. He argues that larger boards exert pressure on 
managers to follow lower gearing levels and enhance firm performance. Abor 
(2007) examined the relationship between corporate governance and capital 
structure decisions of Ghanaian Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) by 
using multivariate regression analysis. The results provide evidence about 
negative relationship between board size and leverage ratios and SMEs with 
larger boards generally have low level of gearing.  
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 Thus, the second hypothesis stated in the null form is:  
  H2: There is no significant relationship between corporate 
governance and capital structure. 
 
Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
 Capital structure is the mix of debt and equity capital maintained by a 
firm, Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that an organization financing is of 
paramount importance to both the managers of firms and providers of funds. 
Brigham and Gapenski (1996) argued that an optimal capital structure can be 
attained if there exists a tax sheltering benefits provided an increase in debt 
level is equal to the bankruptcy costs. They suggested that managers of the 
firm should be able to identify when the optimal capital structure is attained 
and try to maintain it at that level.  
 Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that managers do not always manage 
the firm to maximize returns to shareholders. As a result of this, managers 
may adopt non-profitable investments, even though the outcome is likely to 
be losses for shareholders. They tend to use the free cash flow available to 
fulfil their personal interests instead of investing in positive Net Present 
Value projects that would benefit the shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that 
the agency cost is likely to exacerbate in the presence of free cash flow in the 
firm. In order to mitigate this agency conflict, Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) 
argue that capital structure can be used by increasing the debt level and 
without causing any radical increase in agency costs. This will force the 
managers to invest in profitable ventures that will be of benefit to the 
shareholders. If they decide to invest in non-profitable projects and they are 
unable to pay the interest due to debt holders, the debt holders can force the 
firm to liquidation and managers will lose their decision rights or possibly 
their employment. Thus, the third hypothesis stated in the null form is:  
  H3: There is no significant relationship between capital structure and 
firm performance.  
 
Corporate Governance, Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
 Capital structure can be analysed not only in purely financial terms 
but can also be analysed by looking at the rights and attributes that 
characterise the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of 
intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be 
considered as both financial instruments and CG instruments: debt 
subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity 
allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), by making a distinction between internal and external 
equity, contextualize the relation between ownership and capital structures. It 
can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of CG, 
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not only the mix between debt and equity and their well-known consequences 
as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash 
flow is allocated and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions 
and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined.  
 Developments in the agency theory suggest that CG, together with 
capital structure decisions, influences firm value, in that it mitigates agency 
conflicts between managers, shareholders and debt holders (Putnan 1993). 
Williamson (1988) evaluated the relation between debt and equity in terms of 
CG and firm performance, and affirmed that capital structure is able to 
influence management activity and performance. Coase (1991), stated that it 
is important to pay more attention to the role of capital structure as an 
instrument that can mediate and moderate governance structure within the 
firm and, consequently, firm performance. Thus, the fourth hypothesis stated 
in the null form is:  
  H4: There is no significant intervening effect of capital structure on 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance.  
 
The Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual framework seeks to link CG with firm performance. 
The agency theory analyses the internal CG mechanisms while the free cash 
flow theory looks at how the leverage and external environment effect on 
firm performance. 
Figure 2.1 shows the conceptual model. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 2014                                                                          
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Research Hypotheses 
 The study will seek to test the following hypotheses: 
 H1:  There is no significant relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance among the listed companies at the East 
African community securities exchange. 
 H2:  There is no significant relationship between corporate 
governance and capital structure. 
 H3: There is no significant relationship between capital structure and 
firm performance among the companies listed at the East African community 
securities exchange. 
 H4:  There is no significant intervening effect of capital structure on 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
 
Research Design 
 The research design that was used is descriptive cross-sectional 
design. The study seeks to explain the relative influence of CG on firm 
performance; therefore it employed a descriptive cross-section research 
design, which involves the collection of data to assess the hypothesized 
relationship among variables. The design was also chosen considering the 
type of data and the analysis that was carried out. Aduda and Musyoka 
(2011) used a similar research design, where they investigated the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance of the 
Kenyan banks. 
 
Target Population and Sampling 
 The target population for this study comprised all the listed companies 
at the East African Securities Exchange. There were a total of ninety eight 
(98) companies listed at the East African Securities Exchange as at 31st 
December 2013(61 companies listed NSE, 16 in DSE, 16 in USE and 5 in 
RSE). The intention was to include all the 98 listed companies in the study 
but only 56 firms were finally included in the analysis, because not all the 
companies had full financial reports for the study period. The study only 
considered firms which had been listed and had full financial statements from 
2009 to 2013. The list of quoted companies has been obtained from NSE, 
DSE, USE, RSE and CMA websites.  
 
Data Collection 
 The study used secondary data which was obtained through a review 
of financial statements where an index was constructed both for CG. For firm 
performance the financial statements were reviewed to get Return on Assets 
(ROA).  Capital structure data for calculating leverage was gotten from the 
same financial statements. The period of study was 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
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and 2013. This period is significant because it signifies when the RSE first 
listed companies.  
 A standardized structured CGI index was used and the questions were 
constructed using information obtained from the best code of practice of CG 
from the regulatory authorities in the EAC exchanges. The CGI (See 
Appendix I) was constructed as a proxy for governance and it is based on 56 
binary objective survey questions obtained from secondary data. CGI has a 
value of between 0 and 100, and it is expected that poorly governed firms 
will have lower scores, while better governed companies will have higher 
scores (Brown and Caylor, 2004) 
 
Relating the Variables 
 Multiple regression analyses were used to assess the strength of the 
relationship between dependent, independent and intervening variables. 
Dependent variables being ROA, the independent variables being the 
determinants of CG 
 Y= β0+β1X1+β2X2+ε…….…………………………………3.1 
 Y=ROA 
 B0=intercept, X1=CG, X2=CS, β1, β2 = coefficients, ε= Error term  
 
Descriptive Analysis and Results 
 Descriptive measures involved mean, maximum, minimum, standard 
error of estimate, skewness and kurtosis. The pertinent results are presented 
in Table 4.1 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics results of the main variables included in the model 
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Leverage 280 0.2943
64 
0.2426
11 
2.05
5 
0.14
6 
6.81
3 
0.2
9 
0.001 1.68
45 
Return on Assets 280 0.2051
32 
0.1677
27 
0.48
7 
0.14
6 
0.48
2 
0.2
9 
-
0.440
4 
0.60
18 
Corporate 
Governance index 
280 0.7268
4 
0.1049
42 
0.12
4 
0.14
6 
-
1.27 
0.2
9 
0.54 0.9 
 
 The results showed that leverage had a mean of 0.2943 with a 
minimum of 0.001, a maximum of 1.6845, skewness 2.055 and kurtosis of 
+6.813. Comparatively, Return on Assets had a mean of 0.2051, minimum of 
-0.4404, maximum of 0.6018, skewness of 0.487 and kurtosis of +0.482. 
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Corporate governance index had a mean of 0.7268, minimum of 0.54, 
maximum of 0.90, skewness of 0.124 and kurtosis of -1.27. Analysis of 
skewness shows that leverage, Return on Assets and Corporate Governance 
index are asymmetrical to the right around its mean, therefore it means that 
most of the firms are doing well when the above measures are considered. 
Regulatory compliance index is asymmetrical to the left around its mean, 
which means that most of the index score were less than the mean in the four 
of the EAC countries and additionally, leverage is highly peaked compared to 
other regressors. 
 
Corporate governance 
 The study determined the CG among the companies listed at the East 
Africa Communities Securities Exchange among the East African countries 
i.e.  Kenya (NSE), Tanzania (DSE), Uganda (USE) and Rwanda (RSE). The 
constructs of CG determined comparatively are Board structure and 
composition, ownership and shareholding, board role and responsibilities, 
board remuneration, disclosure and transparency and corporate ethics. The 
comparative results of the four countries are as indicated in figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Corporate Governance Indicators per Securities Exchange 
 
 
 Results from figure 4.1 indicate that the companies listed at the 
EACSE have high scores in all the various indicators of CG measured by 
board structure and composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, 
disclosures and auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics. Under the 
board structure and composition companies listed at NSE, DSE and USE tend 
to have a board size of between 6 and 9 members, role and functions of the 
board are clearly spelt out. There are also indications that most of the 
companies have the chairman and the CEO functions clearly separated. The 
boards also consist of the independent directors. The score for companies 
listed at RSE was 69.8% which was lower than for the other securities 
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exchanges because most of the firms actually started listing from 2009. The 
ownership and shareholding score among the listed companies is also high 
except in RSE where the score is low at 58.1%.    
Table 4.2: Overall Corporate Governance Index (2009-2013) 
YEARS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
NSE 63.6 69.1 72.7 81.8 81.8 
DSE 70.9 72.7 80 90.9 90.9 
USE 70.9 74.5 78.2 85.5 87.3 
RSE 54.5 61.8 67.3 83.7 87.3 
Average score 64.975 69.525 74.55 85.475 86.825 
 
 The finding indicates that the average score of corporate governance 
index for the year 2009 was 64.975%, 2010 was 69.525%, 2011 was 74.55%, 
2012 was 85.475% with 2013 having the highest 86.825%. In 2009 DSE and 
USE had the highest corporate governance index of 70.9%, followed by NSE 
with RSE having the lowest index. In 2010, USE had the highest CGI of 
74.5%, followed by DSE with an index of 72.7%, NSE with 69.1% with RSE 
having the lowest CGI of 61.8%. Further in 2011, DSE had the highest CGI 
of 80%, USE had 78.2%, and NSE had 72.7% with RSE having the lowest 
CGI of 67.3%. In 2012, DSE had the highest CGI of 90.9%, USE had 85.5%, 
and RSE had 83.7% with NSE having the lowest CGI of 81.8%. In 2013, 
DSE had the highest CGI of 90.9%, USE and RSE had 87.3% with NSE 
having the lowest CGI of 81.8%. 
Figure 4.2 Corporate Governance Index per Country 
 
 
 Results in figure 4.2 indicate that CG score has been improving for 
the last five years since 2009 as indicated in Table 4.2. In 2009 the CGI score 
was 64.775% and in 2013 it was 86.825%. The improvements in the score are 
brought about by the information a awareness i.e. the companies are now 
more informed about CG.  
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Table 4.3: Capital structure and firm performance 
 Kenya 
(NSE) 
Tanzania 
(DSE) 
Uganda 
(USE) 
Rwanda 
(RSE) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Capital Structure    
Leverage 0.324 0.021 0.225 0.012 0.422 0.042 0.314 0.043 
Firm performance 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
0.415 0.032 0.316 0.043 0.213 0.069 0.409 0.041 
 
 The study further compared the firms listed at the East African 
Community Securities Exchange i.e. Kenya (NSE), Tanzania (DSE), Uganda 
(USE) and Rwanda (RSE) in terms of their capital structure (leverage and 
firm’s performance (Return on Assets (ROA).  
 The study findings reveals that the overall average score for capital 
structure as far as leverage is concerned for NSE firms (Mean=0.475, 
SD=0.031), Tanzania (Mean=0.376, SD=0.022), Uganda (Mean=0.238, 
SD=0.048) and Rwanda (Mean=0.454, SD=0.041). As far as firm 
performance is concerned, Return on Assets (ROA) for Kenya (NSE) 
(Mean=0.455, SD=0.105), Tanzania (DSE) (Mean=0.391, SD=0.129), 
Uganda (USE) (Mean=1.288, SD=0.177), Rwanda (RSE) (Mean=0.440, 
SD=0.586).  
 
Corporate Governance and Firm performance 
 The first objective of this study was to examine how CG affects firm 
performance among the listed companies in EAC securities exchanges. The 
influence of CG was evaluated based on dimensions of board structure and 
composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, disclosures and 
auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics. These were evaluated 
against the indicators of firm performance in order to test the influence on 
dimensions, various regressions were done to find out if the combined effects 
were sufficient or not to support the hypothesis. Thus, the first hypothesis 
stated in the null form is as follows:  
 H1: There is no significant relationship between CG and firm 
performance among the listed companies at the EAC securities 
exchanges 
 Hypothesis 1 sought to establish the influence of CG on firm 
performance. This hypothesis was tested by regressing CG and firm 
performance guided by the equation 
 Y= β0+β1X 
 Where X represented CG and Y denoted ROA.  The results of the 
regression are presented in table 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.4: Effect of corporate governance on ROA 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .782a .611 .610 .1047843 1.597 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CGI 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -.703 .044  -16.015 .000 
CGI 1.249 .060 .782 20.901 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4.797 1 4.797 436.858 .000b 
Residual 3.052 278 .011   
Total 7.849 279    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CGI 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.028314 .421485 .205132 .1311186 280 
Residual -.4120858 .2454981 0E-7 .1045964 280 
Std. Predicted Value -1.780 1.650 .000 1.000 280 
Std. Residual -3.933 2.343 .000 .998 280 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 The results presented in table 4.4 show that the influence of CG and 
ROA was significant (R=.782). This was an indication that corporate 
governance dimensions explained 61.1% (R2 =.611) of ROA. The other 
variables in the firms explained the remaining 38.96%. The analysis from the 
model had the F value of 436.8. At p-value less than 0.05, the findings thus 
were sufficient to support influence of CG dimensions, implying that CG had 
statistically significant effects on firm performance. The hypothesis that there 
is no significant relationship between CG and firm performance was therefore 
not confirmed for ROA. 
 The results indicate that there is a positive significant relationship 
between CG and firm performance as measured by ROA. The listed 
companies with high CGI score tended to have higher performance. The 
results were consistent with the study conducted by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) who reported that there is a positive relation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance.  
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure 
 The second objective of this study was to assess the relationship 
between CG and capital structure among the listed companies in EAC 
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securities exchanges. The influence of corporate governance was evaluated 
based on certain dimensions (board structure and composition, ownership and 
shareholding, transparency, disclosures and auditing, board remuneration and 
corporate ethics). These were evaluated against the indicators of capital 
structure. To test the influence on dimensions, various regressions were done 
to find out if the combined effects were sufficient or not to support the 
hypotheses. Thus, the second hypothesis stated in the null form is as follows:  
  H2: There is no significant relationship between corporate 
governance and capital structure 
 Hypothesis 2 sought to establish the relationship between corporate 
governance and capital structure. This hypothesis was tested by regressing 
corporate governance and capital structure guided by the equation Y= 
β0+β1X 
 Where X represented corporate governance and Y denoted capital 
structure.  The results of the regression are presented in table 4.5 below. 
Table 4.5: Relationship between corporate governance and capital structure  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .600a .360 .292 .53541 
Predictors: (Constant), board structure and composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, 
disclosures and auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics  
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 9.173 1 1.529 5.333 .000b 
Residual 16.340 278 .287   
Total 25.513 279    
a. Dependent Variable: capital structure 
b. Predictors: (Constant), board structure and composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, 
disclosures and auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics  
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 B Std Error Beta t-value  
 
Significance 
p-value 
(Constant) .328 .117  3.030 .051 
Corporate 
governance 
 
.623 
 
.111 
 
.654 
 
4.564 
 
.000 
a. Dependent Variable: capital structure 
b. Predictors: (Constant), board structure and composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, 
disclosures and auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics  
 The study observed that the results had a relationship between CG and 
capital structure (R=.600). This was an indication that corporate governance 
explained 36.0% (R2 = .360) of capital structure. The other variables affecting 
capital structure explained the remaining 64.0%. The analysis from the model 
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had the F value of 5.333at p-value <0.05, the findings were sufficient to 
support the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure, 
implying that corporate governance had statistically significant effects on 
capital structure. 
 The results indicate that there is a positive significant relationship 
between CG and capital structure. The debt/equity ratio increases as CG 
increases. Although in the literature there are varied results but the study is 
consistent with the study by Berger and Lubrano (2006) who found that firms 
with larger boards that is weak CG tend to have higher leverage.  Their result 
suggest that large board as  proxy for CG which are more entrenched due to 
superior monitoring by regulatory bodies pursue higher leverage to raise 
company value.  
 
Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
 The third objective of this study was to assess the relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance among the listed companies 
in EAC securities exchanges. The influence of capital structure was evaluated 
based on leverage while firm performance was evaluated by considering 
ROA. Thus, the third hypothesis stated in the null form is as follows:  
 H3: There is no significant relationship between capital structure 
and firm performance among the listed companies at the EAC securities 
exchanges 
 Hypothesis 3 sought to establish the influence of capital structure on 
firm performance. This hypothesis was tested by regressing capital structure 
and firm performance guided by the equation Y= β0+β1X 
 Where X represented capital structure and Y denoted ROA.  The 
results of the regression are presented in table 4.6 below. 
Table 4.6: Effect of capital structure on ROA 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .416a .173 .157 .62228 
a. Predictors: (Constant) Leverage 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4.054 1 4.054 10.470 .002a 
Residual 19.361 278 .387   
Total 23.416 279    
a. Predictors: (Constant) Leverage 
b. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
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Coefficients 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients  T 
 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 1.996 .712  2.804 .007 Leverage .940 .256 .651 3.666 .001 
 a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
  
 The results of analysis to establish the effects of capital structure 
dimensions on return on assets are shown in Table 4.6. Results indicate 
relative relationship between capital structure and ROA (R= .416). The 
results indicate that a relationship exists between capital structure and ROA. 
Capital structure as a variable explained 17.3% (R2 =.173) of return on assets 
with the remaining 82.7% explained by other variables. The corresponding F 
value for the model was 10.470 at p-value greater than 0.05 (p<0.5), hence 
implying that capital structure variable was statistically significant effects on 
return on assets. The analysis of significance of capital structure dimensions 
on return on assets is summarized in Table 4.6 above. The hypothesis that 
there is no significant relationship between CG and ROA was therefore not 
confirmed. 
 The results indicate that there is a positive significant relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance as measured by ROA. The 
results were consistent with the study conducted by Pinegar and Wilbricht 
(1989), they argued that capital structure can be used by increasing debt level 
without increasing agency costs and this will force the managers to invest in 
profitable ventures that will benefit the shareholders, because if they decide 
to invest in non-profitable ventures they will be unable to pay debt interest.  
 
Intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm Performance 
 The fourth objective of the study sought to establish whether there is a 
significant intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. The hypothesis is divided into 
three sub hypothesis to consider the individual effects of firm performance as 
measured by ROA. Thus, the firth hypothesis stated in the null form is as 
follows: 
 H4: There is no significant intervening effect of capital structure 
on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
 First, ROA was regressed on corporate governance and the 
standardized regression coefficients (beta) examined to determine the size 
and direction of the relationship and whether it was statistically significant. If 
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this relationship is not statistically significant, there can be no intervened 
effect. The pertinent results are summarized in Table 5.39 
 Secondly, a regression analysis was performed and the betas 
examined for the strength, direction and significance of the relationship. In 
step one, firm performance was regressed on the capital structure and in step 
two, and firm performance was regressed on corporate governance to assess 
if there was a significant change. When controlling for the effects of the 
capital structure on firm performance, the effect of the corporate governance 
on the firm performance should no longer be statistically significant at α=.05. 
The relevant results are summarized in Table 4.7 
Table 4.7: Regression results of ROA on capital structure and corporate governance  
 Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CG .782(.000) .776(.000) .770(.000) 
CS - -.066(.050) -.058(.115) 
CG*CS - - -.108(.004) 
R Square .611 .615 .627 
Adjusted R Square .610 .613 .623 
F Statistics 436.858 221.696 154.708 
Significance .000 .000 .000 
Df1 1 2 3 
Df2 278 277 276 
 
 The results in Table 4.7 show that capital structure explain 62.7% of 
the variation in firm performance (R2 =.627). At step 2, corporate 
governance, adds to the ROA as the variation increased from .611 to .627 (R2 
change=.627 p-value=.000). The results reveal that the variance explained by 
capital structure is significant (p-value=.050) for CS. The results revealed 
that the regression coefficients for corporate governance decreased from 
β=.782, p-value=.000 to β=.770, p-value=.000 when capital structure were 
added to the regression.  
 The hypothesis that there is no significant intervening effect of capital 
structure on the relationship between CG and firm performance was therefore 
not confirmed. The results indicate that there is an insignificant intervening 
effect of capital structure on the relationship between CG and firm 
performance as measured by ROA. 
 
Discussion of the hypotheses tests and research findings 
The influence of CG on firm performance 
 The CG was sub-divided into five sub-indices i.e. board structure and 
composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, disclosures and 
auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics. The results of the 
correlation show that there is a significant positive relationship between CG 
characteristics and firm performance of listed companies. The results 
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evidenced a statistically significant influence of CG on firm performance in 
so far as ROA is concerned. Hypothesis (H1) was therefore not confirmed by 
the study. The results indicated that good CG influences firm performance, 
therefore it can be concluded that higher profitability for firms listed at East 
African securities exchange is due to better CG practices. 
 The above results were supported by prior research on the relationship 
between CG and firm performance. The results were consistent with the 
study conducted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who reported that there is a 
positive relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. It is 
confirmed further by (Ashbaugh et al., 2004) who found a positive 
relationship between CG and firm performance as measured by COC. 
However, other scholars have different views on the relationship between CG 
and firm performance. Cremers and Ferrell (2009) examined the effects of 
corporate governance on the firm‘s operational performance and found a 
negative association between corporate governance and firm performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1996) on the other hand evaluated the effects of 
board composition and effects of direct incentives on firm performance and 
found no relationship. Daily and Dalton (1992) used both accounting based 
measures and market based performance measures and they found no 
association between CG and financial performance.  
 The results about the significance of the relationship between CG and 
firm performance in East Africa securities exchange based on ROA is 
supported by agency theory. According to the literature, the relationship 
between CG and firm performance is grounded on agency theory, which is 
concerned with aligning the interest of shareholders and managers to 
maximize the wealth of the company. Therefore, advocates of agency theory 
argue that the position of CEO and the chairman should be separated, as the 
combined structure can reduce the effectiveness of monitoring (Donaldson 
1990). In support of the agency theory, the separation of the two roles has 
been adopted by companies around the world (Banks 2004).  
 The results also revealed an increase in firm performance for 
companies for the period under review. Therefore, the main purpose of the 
CG mechanism is to provide reassurance to shareholders that managers will 
achieve results which are in the best interest of the shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1997). One way in which this can be achieved is through an 
effectively structured board that ensures the interests of the managers are in 
line with those of the shareholders. The practice of separation of the 
leadership roles is becoming increasingly common among listed companies 
in the East Africa securities exchange. 
 The results of this study also indicated that boards dominated by 
NEDs are significantly related to performance for both accounting-based 
measures and market- based measures. This implies that the companies that 
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complied with the recommendations of code of best practice on corporate 
governance performed well. The Cadbury Report (1992), Hampel Report 
(1998) and OECD principles recommended that boards comprised of a 
majority of non-executive directors. The CMA listing requirements in the 
East Africa community exchanges have also incorporated the above 
principles in their governance practices, NEDs bring independence of mind 
and judgment on issues of strategy and governance on running the business, 
and also see themselves as assisting in enhancing prosperity of the companies 
and play an important part in improving the performance of the business 
(Cadbury 2002).  The results also imply that to be effect , a board must have 
the right mix of skills and experience and work together as a team, which will 
encourage diverse and healthy debate in the interest of the investors and the 
company (Roche 2005 ). 
 
The effect of CG on capital structure 
 The second objective of the study was to establish the relationship 
between CG and capital structure.  On the basis of this objective, the study 
hypothesized that there is no relationship between CG and capital structure. 
The assessment of CG and capital structure was done by reviewing the 
financial statements of companies listed at the East Africa community 
security exchanges. The hypothesis that there is no relationship between CG 
and firm performance was therefore not confirmed. These results are in line 
with existing literature which links CG and capital structure.  
 The study indicates that CG is positively correlated to capital 
structure. Capital structure as measured by leverage shows the relationship 
between long term liabilities and shareholder’s equity and it can be a 
powerful tool to implement CG. According to CG principles shareholders 
equity should be greater than the long term liabilities to create value (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992). The correlation coefficient between CG and capital 
structure was a positive correlation (β=.623). The study results are supported 
by literature although there are varied results. Berger and Lubrano (2006) 
found that firms with larger board membership have lower leverage or debt 
ratio and they assumed that larger board’s size translates into strong pressure 
from the corporate board to make managers pursue lower leverage due to 
superior monitoring. The results were also supported by Berger et al., 1997 
who stated that firms with higher leverage rather have relatively more outside 
directors.  According to Abor (2007) there exist a significant negative 
relationship between CEO duality and leverage where it implies that larger 
boards adopt low debt policy. The second hypothesis (H2) was to test 
whether there is no significant relationship between CG and capital structure 
is. H2 was rejected in that there was a significant positive relationship 
between CG and capital structure (Table 6.37) 
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The effect of capital structure on firm performance 
 The third objective of the study was to determine the relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance of listed companies at the 
East African securities exchange. The firm performance was measured by 
ROA. The study results indicated that there is a positive significant 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance for all the three 
indicators of measurements used in the study. The hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance was therefore not 
confirmed. These results are in line with existing literature which links 
capital structure and firm performance. 
 The literature reviewed indicated that there are positive and negative 
significant relationship between capital structure and firm performance. The 
study findings is supported by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Stulz (2004) who 
stated  that there is a positive significant relationship between capital 
structure firm performance. There are also other studies who found a negative 
significant relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that there is a 
negative significant relationship between capital structure and performance 
which is associated with growth opportunities, interest coverage and 
probability of reorganization following default. There are also earlier studies 
by Modigliani and Miller (1958) which pointed out that capital structure is 
irrelevant i.e.  Leverage has no significant relationship with firm value which 
depends only on the assets held by the firm. The third hypothesis (H3) is 
therefore rejected in that there is a positive significant relation between 
capital structure and firm performance. 
 
The intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship between 
CG and firm performance 
 Objective four sought to establish whether capital structure was 
intervening on the effect of CG on firm performance. The Baron and Kenny 
(1986) approach was used to test the hypothesis that there is no significant 
intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship between CG and 
firm performance. The results yielded a significant intervening effect 
between CG, capital structure and firm performance as measured by ROA. 
The hypothesis that there is no significant intervening effect of capital 
structure on the relationship between CG and firm performance was 
therefore not confirmed. Firm performance is enhanced when there is good 
CG which will also influence the capital structure of the listed companies. 
 There is empirical evidence that the firm performance depends on CG 
and capital structure decisions. The agency theory suggest that CG together 
with capital structure decisions influences firm performance, in that it 
mitigates agency conflicts between managers, shareholders and debt holders 
(Putnan ,1993). The firm’s financial choice that alters ownership assets 
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modifies the importance and the intensity of some of the primary 
stakeholders’ interest in firm governance. Capital structure can be analysed 
not only in purely financial terms it can also be analysed by looking at the 
rights and attributes that characterise the firm’s assets and that influence, with 
different levels of governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be 
considered as both financial instruments and CG instruments: debt 
subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity 
allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), by making a distinction between internal and external 
equity, contextualize the relation between ownership and capital structures. It 
can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of CG, 
not only the mix between debt and equity but how to make decisions and 
manage the firm must be dealt with (Zingales, 2000). 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 The main objective of this research study was to examine the effect of 
capital structure on the relationship between CG and firm performance 
among the listed companies at the EACSE. To address this objective, a 
checklist based on the CG principles and Corporate Laws was compiled and a 
comprehensive analysis of the financial statements done.  
 The study has indicated that good CG enhances firm performance and 
this has supported the existing literature. The inclusion of capital structure as 
an intervening variable has influenced the interactions between CG and firm 
performance which was positively significant. Therefore the importance of 
CG cannot be over-emphasized since it enhances the organizational climate 
for the internal structures and performance of a company. Indeed, CG brings 
to bear through external independent directors, new dimension for effective 
running of a corporate entity thereby enhancing a firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurship and competitiveness. The adoption of corporate principles is 
a giant step towards creating safeguards against corruption and 
mismanagement, promoting transparency in economic life and attracting 
more domestic and foreign investment. In addition an effective program to 
combat corruption is also capable of protecting shareholder value is an 
important requirement for improvement of CG practices in East Africa.  
 
Limitations of the study 
 First, the study was based on the listed companies at the East African 
securities exchange which may limit the generalisation of results to other 
jurisdictions such as to developed countries or to the non listed companies. 
The population from which the sample is drawn was all the listed companies 
therefore, results of this study may not be generalised to smaller and non-
listed companies.  
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 Secondly, study only integrated only five important variables of CG: 
board structure and composition, ownership and shareholding, transparency, 
disclosures and auditing, board remuneration and corporate ethics. However, 
there is a variety of other important governance variables that have important 
effects on financial performance and are not included in this framework, such 
as state owned shares.  In addition, this study only investigated some the 
board of directors‘ characteristics including board size, share ownership, 
frequency of board meeting and board remuneration; however, other 
characteristics (such as age, education, gender and so on) might also strongly 
influence the relationship between CG and firm performance.  
 Thirdly, the study has assessed the interactive relationship between 
the CG and capital structure; however, I also acknowledge the possibility that 
capital structure decisions characteristics can influence the individual 
governance variables.  
 Finally, the capital markets developments in the EAC are at different 
levels. Kenya has got sixty one (61) listed companies while Tanzania and 
Uganda have got sixteen (16) each while Rwanda have got only five (5) listed 
companies. Burundi still does not have a security exchange; most of their 
funds are generated through loans from commercial banks. The cross-
sectional analysis was not very effective in that some of the companies had 
not implemented the CG guidelines fully due to the stage of capital markets 
developments. 
 Despite the above limitations, the quality of the study was not 
compromised. The study has made an immense contribution to the existing 
body of knowledge, especially in the area of CG which has not been fully 
exploited.    
 
References: 
Abor, J. (2007). Corporate governance and financing decisions of Ghanaian 
listed firms, Corporate    Governance, 7 (1): 83 – 92. 
Aduda, J. & Musyoka, L.(2011).The relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance in Kenyan banking industry. Journal of 
Accountancy.Vol.3(6) 
Ashbaugh, H., Collins, D. S., & LaFond, R. (2004).Corporate governance 
and cost of equity capital.Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 203-243.  
Baron, R. M., & David A. K. (1986), Moderator-Mediator Variables 
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and 
Statistical Considerations, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 
(6), 1173-82 
Baysinger, B. D., &  Butler, H. D. (1985). Corporate Governance and the 
Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition,” 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, pp. 101−124. 
European  Scientific Journal   March  2015  edition vol.11, No.7   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
530 
Berger , A. N.,  Herring, R. J.,  Szego, G. P.  (1995).  The role of Capital in 
financial institutions. Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol. 19 Page 393-430   
Berger, A. N., & Lubrano, P. E. (2006). Capital structure and firm 
performance; a new approach to testing agency theory.Journal of Banking 
and Finance.. 
Berle, A.A., & Means, G. C. (1932).The modern corporation and private 
property, New York, Larcourt, Brace and World Inc. 
 
Black, B. S., Jang, H., &  Kim, W. (2006). Does Corporate Governance 
Predict Firms' Market Values? Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, Vol. 22. 
Brigham, E., &  Gapenski, L. (1996). Financial Management. Dallas: The 
Dryden Press.   
Brown, L., & Caylor, M. (2006). Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Volume 25, issue 4, July/August. 
409-434. 
Cadbury, A. (1992).Codes of Best Practice, Report from the committee on 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.London, Gee Publishing. 
 CMA (2012). Statistical bulletin www.cma .or.ke. 
Coase, R. H. (1991). The Nature of the Firm: Meaning in the Nature of the 
Firm: Origins, Evolution and Development. Oxford University Press, New 
York \Claessens, S. (2002). Corporate governance in Asia: a survey. 
International Review of Finance, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 71-103. 
Craig, V. V. (2005). The Changing Corporate Governance Environment: 
Implications for the Banking Industry. FDIC Banking Review. Page 1-15  
Daily, C. M. & Dalton, D. R.(1992). The relationship between governance 
structure and corporate performance. Journal of  Business Venturing: 375-
386. 
Donaldson, L. (1990). The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and 
Management Theory, Journal of Management Review, vol. 15, pp. 369-81 
Hart, O. (1995). Firms  contracts and financial structure. Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 98, pp.1119-58 
Harris, M. &  Harris, M.(1991). The theory of capital structure. Journal of 
Finance 46, 297-356. 
Hermalin, B. E. & Weisbach, M. S. (2001). Board of Directors as 
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Literature. Economic 
Policy Review 
Hermalin, B. E. & Weisbach, M. S. (1996). The effects of board composition 
and direct incentives on firm performance, Financial management, Vol. 20, 
No. 4, pp. 101. 
Himmelberg, C. (2002). Measuring the real effects of corporate governance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 353–384. 
European  Scientific Journal   March  2015  edition vol.11, No.7   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
531 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers, American Economic Review 76:323−329. 
Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of 
internal control systems, Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880. 
Jensen,  M. & Ruback,  R. (1983). The market for corporate control. Journal 
of Financial Economics 11 5-50. North-Holland Publishing Company 
Lipton, M. & Lorsch, J. W. (1992).  A Modest Proposal for Improved 
Corporate Governance. The Business Lawyer, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 59. 
Lishenga,  J. (2012). Corporate governance reaction to declining firm 
performance: Evidence from NSE, African Journal of Business Management 
Vol.1 
Keasey, K. & Wright, M.(1993). Issues in Corporate Accountability and 
Governance.Accounting and Business Research.  Vol. 23 (91a) Pages 291-
303  
 Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1963). Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of 
Capital: a Correction, American Economic Review 53, 433-443 
Modigliani, F. &  Miller,M. (1958).The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review 48, 261-297 
Myers, S. C. (2001).Economic Perspectives The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2. (Spring, 2001), pp. 81-102. 
OECD, (1999).OECD Principles of Corporate Governance,Paris: OECD 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: civic tradition in modern Italy.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Shleifer,A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997).A survey of corporate governance. The 
Journal of Finance, 52, 737-783. 
Stulz,R., Karoyli, A.&  Doidge, C. (2004).Why do countries matter so much 
for Corporate Governance? Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.86,1-9. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185–212. 
Williamson, O. (1988). Corporate finance and corporate governance, Journal 
of Finance, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 567-591. 
World Bank. (2000). Corporate governance: A framework for 
Implementation. A World Bank Country Study, Washington. 
Zingales, L. (2000). In search of new foundations, Journal of Finance, vol. 
55, no. 4, pp. 1623-1653. 
 
  
European  Scientific Journal   March  2015  edition vol.11, No.7   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
532 
Appendices 
Appendix i: data capture form: corporate governance index (cgi) 
Name of the company………………………………serial no/001/2014 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
(CGI) 
“1” if is yes 
and “0” if the 
response is no 
09 10 11 12 13 TOTAL 
 
Sub Index  A: Board Structure and 
Composition 
       
1. Board size is between 6-9 
2. Role and functions of board is 
stated 
3. Chairman and CEO separation 
4. Information about independent 
directors 
5. Board meeting attendance 
6. Outside directors attendance in 
meetings 
7. Existence of the position of CFO 
8. Directors representing minority 
shareholders 
9. Biography of  the board members 
10. Changes is the board structure is 
indicated 
       
 
Sub Index  B: Ownership and Share 
holding 
       
1. Presence of outside blockholders 
(more than 10%) 
2. The CEO own shares 
3. Directors ownership (block 
ownership) other than the CEO 
and Chairman 
4. Chairman or CEO is block holder 
(10%) 
5. Concentration of ownership (top 
five) 
6. Dividend policy 
7. Disclosure of staff benefits other 
than wages and salaries 
8. Disclosure of company secretary 
in annual report with description 
of duties and  roles 
       
 
Sub Index  C: Transparency, Disclosures 
and Auditing 
       
1. The company have full disclosure 
of CG practices 
2. Disclosure of payment to auditors 
for consulting and other work 
3. Internal audit committee 
4. Board of directors and executive 
staff members remuneration 
5. Annual report of share ownership 
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6. Employee ownership 
7. Auditor appointment and rotation 
8. Annual reports through internet 
9. Disclosure of other events in the 
internet 
10. Chairman’s statement 
 
 
Sub Index  D: Board Remuneration 
 
       
1. Remuneration committee 
2. Composition of the remuneration 
committee 
3. Policy framework for the 
remunerating committee 
4. Remuneration committee 
comprises non-executive board 
members 
5. CEO compensation  is disclosed 
6. Compensation in form of stock 
bonus 
7. Loans or advances to board 
members not provided 
8. Balance between guaranteed 
salary and performance element 
(share option) 
9. Remuneration policy disclosed in 
annual report 
10. Majority of the remuneration 
committee members are non-
executive 
 
       
 
Sub Index  E: Corporate Ethics        
1. Corporate ethics committee in 
place 
2. Code of ethical conduct 
3. Code of conduct is published 
4. Notice of annual general meeting 
5. Agenda of the annual general 
meeting 
6. Compliance with CMA 
guidelines 
7. Environmental and social 
responsibility 
8. Disclosure of adherence to the 
company’s code of ethics 
       
Source: Black et al. (2006) 
 
  
